George D\u27Ambrosio and Theresa D\u27Ambrosio v. Francis C. Lund : Brief of Defendant and Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
George D'Ambrosio and Theresa D'Ambrosio v.
Francis C. Lund : Brief of Defendant and Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
G. Hal Taylor; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, D'Ambrosio v. Lund, No. 9202 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3591
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH E D -~--f' \ 1\Ph- 1960 
GEORGE D'AMBROSIO and -~~~-----··ci ___ k ____ -~~,-~-~~~ c~~;.t~--Lit~h--
THERESA D'AMBROSIO, er' 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
FRANCIS C. LUND, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9202 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, 
FRANCIS C. LUND 
G. HAL TAYLOR 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
366 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUBJECT INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 6 
Point I 
The trial court erred in failing and refusing to make any 
findings of fact upon the material allegations of defend-
ant's answer because the evidence is clear and uncontra-
dicted that the plaintiff George D'Ambrosio agreed to 
accept stock in Cottonwood Uranium Corporation for his 
$500.00; and, that the evidence is clear that the defendant 
complied with his instructions from the plaintiff to pur-
chase stock of Cottonwood Uranium Corporation.__________ 7 
Point II 
The trial court erred in making findings of fact which 
are not supported by the evidence. ------------------------------------ 10 
Point III 
The trial court erred in granting judgment to plaintiffs 
on the theory that the money received by the defendant 
was never invested in the uranium company as agreed by 
the parties and that th~ defendant has not accounted for 
said funds because such theory is a variance from the 
pleadings and defendant did not have an opportunity to 
meet such issue. _______ -- ___ --- ------------------------ __ ----- _____ ------------ ___ 14 
Point IV 
The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to 
amend the judgment because considering all of the evi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
dence most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence is 
insufficient to support any money ju~gme~t and the_ sole 
relief to which the plaintiffs are entitled 1s the_ dehvery 
of the certificate of stock in Cottonwood U rantum Cor-
poration. ______________ -------------··----- ----------------------------------------------- 18 
ARGUMENT __________________________ ------------------------------------------------ 7 
CON CL USI 0 N -------------------··-------------------------------------------------- 20 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Gaddis Investment Company vs. Charles H. Morrison, 
(Utah) 2 78 P2d. 28 5 -------------------------------------------------------- 9 
Malstrom vs. Consolidated Theatres, (Utah) 290 P2d 689.. 10 
National Farmers Union Prop. & Gas Co. vs. Thompson, 
(Utah) 286 P2d. 249 ---------------------------------------------------- 16 
Parowan Mercantile Company vs. Gurr, (Utah) 30 P2d. 
2 0 7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Rock vs. Gustaveson Oil Company, (Utah) 204 Pac. 96 ________ 18 
Taylor vs. E. M. Royal Corporation, (Utah) 264 P2d. 279 15 
Van Noy vs. Gibbs, (Utah) 318 P2d. 3 51 ---------------------------- 19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE D'AMBROSIO and 
THERESA D'AMBROSIO, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
FRANCIS C. LUND, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9202 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, 
FRANCIS C. LUND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During July of 1954 the plaintiff George D'Ambrosio 
first discussed the question of investment of money with the 
defendant, Mr. Lund. Mr. Lund was forming a number of 
different corporations at that time. Mr. D'Ambrosio asked 
Mr. Lund if he (Lund) ever ran into a corporation where 
he (D'Ambrosio) could invest some money, he would like 
to invest (R. 19). 
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Subsequent thereto, Mr. Lund told Mr. D'Ambrosio he 
was forming a corporation and inquired if Mr. D'Ambrosio 
would like to invest in it (R. 19). Mr. D'Ambrosio was pur-
chasing the stock for an investment (R. 20). 
There is considerable conflict in the testimony as to just 
which corporation Mr. D'Ambrosio was to invest in or at least 
what the name of the corporation to be formed was going to 
be. However, this conflict would seem immaterial inasmuch 
as the plaintiff George D'Ambrosio stated that he was notified 
that his money had been placed in Cottonwood Uranium; that 
he made no objection thereto; and that he considered that 
Mr. Lund was making the investment pursuant to Mr. D'Am-
brosio's instructions (R. 21) . The stock certificate in Cotton-
wood Uranium Corporation was not delivered until after the 
commencement of the lawsuit when said stock certificate was 
tendered and delivered to the Clerk of the Court to be delivered 
to the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiff George D'Ambrosio gave Mr. Lund a check 
for $500.00 on or about the 26th day of September, 1954, 
which fact was admitted upon pretrial. The $500.00 was 
given by Mr. Lund to one Fred D. Kipp, \vho was a promoter 
and director of the corporation. Mr. D'Ambrosio's name was 
listed on the list of stock to be issued and the $500.00 was 
placed. in a bank account used by the incorporators by Mr. 
Kipp (R. 13). Mr. D'Ambrosio made several demands for 
his stock and each time a demand was made upon Mr. Lund 
by Mr. D'Ambrosio, he, Mr. Lund, would attempt to locate 
the officers and see if he could get the certificate issued and 
each time n1ade a demand upon the corporation (R. 26-27). 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In plaintiffs' original complaint (R. 1) plaintiffs alleged 
that defendant was given a check in the sum of $500.00, which 
fact was admitted. The plaintiffs further alleged that the 
check was given for stock in a corporation to be formed by 
the defendant and alleged on information and belief that 
the corporation was never formed and that demand was made 
for the return of the money, which demand was refused and 
that defendant never tendered stock to the plaintiffs. The 
defendant answered, admitting that he had received the check 
in the sum of $500.00 and denied each and every other allega-
tion. 
As a separate defense, the defendant alleged that the 
plaintiff George D'Ambrosio gave him instructions to pur-
chase stock in a corporation which was to be formed by certain 
clients of the defendant. That the defendant purchased said 
stock pursuant to the instructions of the plaintiff George 
D'Ambrosio of Cottonwood Uranium Corporation, a Nevada 
corporation. That said stock has now been issued by the cor-
poration and said stock was tendered to the clerk of the 
District Court to be delivered to the plaintiffs (R. 2). 
At the pretrial of the matter, it was admitted that defendant 
got the check for $500.00 for the purpose of purchasing stock. 
Plaintiffs claimed at pretrial that the defendant was liable 
for the refund of the $500 with interest on two theories: First, 
that the corporation was never formed; and, Second, that in 
the event it was fonned that the defendant failed to deliver 
the stock and that there was a difference in the value between 
the time when the stock should have been delivered and the 
present time, which would be the measure of damages and 
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that that amount is $500.00. In defense, the defendant con-
tended that the corporation was formed and that the corpo-
ration was Cotton,vood Uranium Corporation of Nevada. 
Further, the defendant contended that the stock in Cottonwood 
U rani urn Corporation was purchased pursuant to plaintiff 
George D'Ambrosio's instructions. 
The case was tried before The Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, one of the judges of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sitting without 
a Jury. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING ANDRE-
FUSING TO MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT UPON 
THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANT'S 
ANSWER BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR AND 
UNCONTRADICTED THAT THE PLAINTIFF GEORGE 
D'AMBROSIO AGREED TO ACCEPT STOCK IN COT-
TONWOOD UR.i\NIUM CORPORATION FOR HIS 
$500.00; AND, THAT THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT 
THE DEFENDANT COMPLIED WITH HIS INSTRUC-
TIONS FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO PURCHASE STOCK 
OF COTTONWOOD URANIUM CORPORATION. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS 
OF FACT WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDG· 
MENT TO PLAINTIFFS ON THE THEORY THAT THE 
MONEY RECEIVED BY THE DEFENDANT WAS NEVER 
INVESTED IN THE URANIUM COMPANY AS AGREED 
BY THE PARTIES AND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS 
NOT ACCOUNTED FOR SAID FUNDS BECAUSE SUCH 
THEORY IS A VARIANCE FROM THE PLEADINGS 
AND DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTU-
NITY TO MEET SUCH ISSUE. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT BE-
CAUSE CONSIDERING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS, THE EVIDENCE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ANY MONEY JUDGMENT 
AND THE SOLE RELIEF TO WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS 
ARE ENTITLED IS THE DELIVERY OF THE CERTIFI-
CATE OF STOCK IN COTTONWOOD URANIUM COR-
PORATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING ANDRE-
FUSING TO MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT UPON 
THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANT'S 
ANS\VER BECAlJSE THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR AND 
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UNCONTRADICT'ED THAT THE PLAINTIFF GEORGE 
D'AMBROSIO AGREED TO ACCEPT STOCK IN COT-
.TONWOOD URANIUM CORPORATION FOR HIS 
$500.00; AND, THAT 'THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT 
THE DEFENDANT COMPLIED WITH HIS INSTRUC-
TIONS FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO PURCHASE STOCK 
OF COTTONWOOD URANIUM CORPORATION. 
In defendant's answer (R. 2) and in the pretrial order 
(R. 4) the defendant raised as an affirmative defense the 
issue that the defendant purchased stock in Cottonwood Ura-
nium Corporation pursuant to the instructions of the plaintiff 
George D'Ambrosio and that said stock was issued and ten-
dered to the Clerk of the District Court to be delivered to the 
plaintiffs. The trial court made no finding of fact with regard 
to these issues and made no finding as to what disposition 
should be made of the stock certificate in Cottonwood Uranium 
Corporation "'hich was placed in evidence. The only finding 
of fact which could be considered as touching upon this matter 
is Finding No. 8, which reads: ((There is no evidence that 
the $500.00 given to the defendant by plaintiff ever went in to 
Cottonwood Uranium Corporation." Such finding is, of course, 
not supported by the evidence as will hereinafter be pointed 
out. The best evidence in the record as to whether or not the 
stock was purchased in Cottonwood U rani urn Corporation is 
plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 which \vas adn1itted in the evidence 
and is a certificate of stock for 500 shares of $1.00, par value, 
stock. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of 
Parou)ctJJ 1llercantile Cornpany VJ. Gu,n·, (Utah) 30 P2d. 207, 
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held with regard to making findings on all material issues as 
follows: 
The law is well settled that the findings w4en com-
pared with the pleadings must be within the issues and 
be responsive thereto, and must cover the material 
issues raised by the pleadings, whether they arise be-
cause of allegations in the complaint and denied by 
the answer, or upon affirmative defense pleaded in 
the ans\ver, or upon a counterclaim, denied by answer 
thereto or treated as denied, and this is required 
whether evidence be introduced or not upon such 
issues, and if there be no finding upon a material issue 
the judgment cannot be supported. (Citing cases). 
In a later ~ase decided after the adoption of the new 
rules, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of 
Gaddis Investment Company vs. Charles H. Morrison} (Utah) 
278 P2d. 285, considered a case wherein the defendant's 
answer raised an issue of abandonment of the contract and 
the trial court made no finding with regard to such issue. The 
court held: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 provides: 
]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury * * * 
the court shall, unless the same are waived, find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate 
judgn1ent; * * * .' It appears that the judgment was 
based principally upon the findings that the contract 
was entered into and the commission had not been 
paid, totally disregarding defendant's answer to the 
complaint. It has been frequently held that the failure 
of the trial court to make findings of fact on all material 
issues is reversible error where it is prejudicial. Hall 
v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343; 198 P. 1110; Baker v. Hatch, 
70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673; Prows v. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
271 P. 31; Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah 178; 278 P. 529; 
West v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300; 17 P.2d 
292; Pike v. Clark, 95 Utah 235, 79 P.2d 1010. 
We submit that the failure to make a finding with regard 
to whether or not the defendant purchased stock in Cottonwood 
Uranium Corporation was prejudicial to the defendant. A 
finding that such stock was not purchased could not possibly 
be supported by the evidence and a finding that the stock in 
Cottonwood Uranium Corporation was purchased pursuant 
to the instructions of the plaintiff George D'Ambrosio would, 
of necessity, require a conclusion of law that the defendant had 
complied with the instructions of plaintiff and consequently 
judgment should or would have to be entered in favor of the 
defendant with regard to the money judgment and judgment 
granting to plaintiffs their stock in Cottonwood Uranium Cor-
poration would be the only judgment which could be supported 
by such a finding. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS 
OF FACT WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
It is recognized by appellant that the cardinal rule on 
appeal with regard to the evidence supporting the findings 
of the trial court is that if there is any substantial evidence 
supporting the finding, it will not be disturbed. 11Ialstro11z z1s. 
Consolidated TheatresJ 290 P2d. 689. How:ever, the cases all 
recognize that there n1ust be some substantial evidence to sup-
port any finding of fact. 
10 
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We submit that the following findings of fact are not 
supported by any evidence and that some of them, as indicated, 
are contrary to the only evidence in the record with regard 
to the patticular subject. 
(a) That portion of Paragraph 3 which states that plaintiff 
George D'Ambrosio never appeared as a stockholder in any 
company as a result of the payment of the $500.00 to the 
defendant. 
(b) That portion of Finding No. 6 which states Hto the 
best of plaintiffs' know ledge (Cottonwood Uranium) has no 
assets, that no other stock has been issued except the 5 00 share 
certificate to the plaintiffs which was delivered in July, 1958, 
after this action was begun." 
(c) Finding No. 7. 
(d) Finding No. 8. 
The negative finding in finding of fact No. 3, that George 
D'Ambrosio never appeared as a stockholder in any company 
as a result of the payment of $500.00 is contrary to the evi-
dence. There is absolutely no evidence in the record which 
would justify such a finding. The only evidence with regard 
to whether or not George D'Ambrosio was a stockholder in 
Cottonwood Uranium Corporation is the testimony of Mr. 
Lund. When asked by plaintiffs' counsel, ((Was an order ever 
put in to Cottonwood Uranium which was for $500.00 worth 
of stock for Mr. D'Ambrosio at the time that it was incor-
porated?". Mr. Lund answered, ((His name was listed, yes." 
Question: "In what manner was it listed?" Answer: ((On the 
list of stock to be issued" (R. 13). The only other evidence 
11 
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in the record with regard to whether or not Mr. D'Ambrosio 
was a stockholder in Cottonwood Uranium Corporation is 
the stock certificate itself, Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2, which was 
admitted in evidence (R. 30) . 
Finding of fact No. 6 makes two findings which are not 
supported by any substantial evidence. Such finding states, 
((To the best of plaintiffs' knowledge (Cottonwood Uranium 
Corporation) has no assets." A perusal of the testimony of 
the plaintiff George D'Ambrosio on both direct and cross 
examination (R. 16-22) indicates there is not one scintilla of 
evidence with regard to whether or not plaintiff had any 
know ledge as to whether or not the corporation did or did not 
have assets. No question was asked the plaintiff Mr. D'Ambro-
sio on either direct or cross examination concerning this issue. 
Now here in the record was the issue raised as to whether or not 
the corporation had any assets with the exception of o~e ques-
tion which plaintiffs' counsel asked the defendant (R. 12). The 
defendant was asked, ((Do you know whether the corporation 
has any properties at this time?" Answer: ((No." 
With regard to the issuance of stock, other than the 500 
shares, there is no evidence in the record to support the co~rt's 
finding that there \vas no other stock issued. The only reference 
made thereto is a question by plaintiffs' counsel (R. 15) 
wherein defendant was asked ((Do you knO\\' v.rhether the first 
100 certificates \vere ever issued?" Answer: ((No, I don't 
know." 
Finding of fact No. 7 is the finding of an ultin1ate fact 
that said stock is without value. The transcript of the pro-
ceedings in this case is short, consisting of son1e t\venty-two 
12 
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pages (R. 7-29). A perusal of the entire record indicates that 
there is not one scintilla of evidence that said stock is without 
value. While finding of fact No. 7 seems to be a finding that 
the stock, as of the time of judgment, was without value, the 
record indicates that money was paid into the corporation 
at the time it was formed and that it had assets consisting 
of uranium properties at the time that it was formed (R. 10). 
Thereafter, no questions were asked with regard to the dis-
position of the assets or of the moneys that were paid into the 
corporation upon its formation. Thus, no direct substantial 
evidence exists in the record to justify finding of fact No. 7 
that said stock is without value. 
Finding of fact No. 8 is a negative finding that there 
ts no evidence that the $500.00 given to the defendant by 
plaintiff ever went into Cottonwood Uranium Corporation. 
This finding is not only not supported by the evidence, but 
is contrary to the only evidence in the record with regard to 
the disposition of the $500.00. The testimony of the defendant, 
Mr. Lund, (R. 9 and R. 13) sets forth the disposition that 
was made of plaintiffs' $500.00. In essence the testimony in-
dicates that the money was given to Fred D. Kipp, a promoter 
and director of the corporation. The $500.00 was placed by 
Kipp. in a bank account used by the incorporators of Cotton-
\vood Uranium Corporation. An order was put in to Cotton-
wood Uranium for $500.00 worth of stock at the time it was 
incorporated and that the plaintiff George D(Ambrosio' s name 
was listed on the list of stock to be issued. Further, the stock 
was issued and tendered into court. 
There being no substantial evidence in the record to sup-
13 
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port the foregoing findings of fact, such findings must fail. 
The conclusions of law are not justified by the findings and, 
therefore, the judgment should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COlJRT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDG 
MENT TO PLAINTIFFS ON THE THEORY THAT THE 
MONEY RECEIVED BY THE DEFENDANT WAS NEVER 
INVESTED IN THE URANIUM COMPANY AS AGREED 
BY THE PARTIES AND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS 
NOT ACCOUNTED FOR SAID FUNDS BECAUSE SUCH 
THEORY IS A VARIANCE FROM THE PLEADINGS 
AND DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTU-
NITY TO MEET SUCH ISSUE. 
The plaintiffs in this action proceeded to trial upon two 
theories: First, that the -corporation was never formed; and, 
Second, that in the event it was formed that the defendant failed 
to deliver the stock and that there was a difference in the 
value between the time when the stock should have been de-
livered and the present time which would be the measure of 
damages and that that amount is $500.00. Apparently, plaintiffs 
abandoned their second theory because there is no evidence 
at all in the record with regard to the value of the stock at 
different times nor is any finding of fact made with regard to 
the value of the stock at the time it should have been issued 
or at the time it was issued. No mention is made as to when 
the stock should have been delivered, nor is there any showing 
or finding that the defendant was under any duty to deliver 
th_e stock. With regard to the first theory, to-\vit, the corporation 
14 
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was never formed, the evidence adduced at trial shows con-
clusive! y that such corporation was formed and that the 
plaintiffs acquiesced in the purchase of stock in Cottonwood 
Uranium Corporation. 'The plaintiff George D'Ambrosio on 
cross-examination (R. 21) when asked, uy ou considered he 
was making the investment pursuant to your instructions at 
that time?'' Mr. D'Ambrosio answered, ((Yes." Mr. D'Ambrosio 
testified that he was notified that his money was being placed 
in Cottonwood Uranium, and, further, that he made no objec-
tion at the time he was told that his money was to be invested 
in Cottonwood Uranium. 
The trial court's conclusion of law, to-wit, ((The money 
was never invested in the uranium company as agreed by the 
parties and the defendant has not accounted for said funds," 
while, we submit, is not supported by the evidence as here-
inbefore set forth, does set forth the theory upon which the 
trial court apparently felt that plaintiffs should have judgment 
against the defendant. It should be noted that the plaintiffs 
sought no amendment of his pleadings nor did he demand 
any relief in the nature of an accounting for said funds upon 
the theory that the money was never invested in the uranium 
company as agreed by the parties. This court in the case of 
Taylor vs. E. M. Royal Corporation, (Utah) 264 P2d. 279, 
considered a situation wherein the plaintiff sued to recover 
on an express contract and the trial court charged the defendant 
with liability under quantum meruit. This court posed the 
question and answered the same as follows: 
Quaere: Under our new rules can one recover on a 
contract implied in 1 aw where he pleads and attempts 
to prove an express contract, seeking no amendment 
15 
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of his pleadings, demanding no reli~f under and urg-
ing no claim under a quantum merutt or other theory? 
Plaintiff says Rule 54 (c) ( 1), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure resolves the question affirmatively. We dis· 
agree. The rule reads in part that (( * * * every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party 
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the 
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. 
* * * " 
* * * 
It is true that our new rules should be ((liberally 
construed'' to secure a ( (just * * * determination of 
every action,'' but they do not represent a one-way 
street down which but one litigant may travel. The rules 
allow locomotion in both directions by all interested 
travelers. They allow plaintiffs considerable latitUde 
in pleading and proof, to the point where some people 
have expressed the opinion that careless legal crafts-
manship has been invited rather than discouraged. Be 
that as it may, a defendant must be extended every 
reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and to meet 
an adversary's claims. Also he must be protected against 
surprise and be assured equal opportunity and facility 
to present and prove counter contentions,-else uni-
lateral justice and injustice would result sufficient to 
raise serious doubts as to constitutional due process 
guarantees. 
Again in the case of National FarnzerJ Union Prop. & Gas 
Co. vs. Thonzpson_. (Utah) 286 P2d 249, this court held: 
Not\vithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate tech-
nicalities and liberalize procedure, we must not lose 
sight of the cardinal principle that under our system 
of justice, if ~n issue is to be tried and a party's rights 
concluded wtth respect thereto, he must have notice 
thereof and an opportunity to meet it. This is recog-
16 
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nized in Rule 15 (b) which recites that such liberal 
amendments shall be allowed if the issue is tried ((by 
express or implied consent of the parties." 
We submit that it .is self -evident that the defendant had no 
opportunity, in view of the status of the pleadings, to present 
evidence with regard to the investment of the $500.00 or to 
account to the plaintiffs for said funds. At the conclusion 
• 
of plaintiffs' case the defendant moved to dismiss on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs had not proved that they were 
entitled to recover. This motion was denied and thereafter 
the only testimony which defendant adduced was some testi-
mony with regard to the name of the corporation and the 
fact that each time he received a demand from Mr. D'Ambrosio 
for his stock, that he attempted to locate the officers and get 
the certificate issued (R. 25-27). It was not until the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law were signed by the trial court 
that defendant had an opportunity to determine that the trial 
court was granting judgment on a theory not embraced within 
the pleadings or the pretrial order. Be that as it may, it would 
appear that in view of the st~tus of the record and defendant's 
contention that the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
were not supported by the evidence that the judgment of the 
trial court will, of necessity, have to be reversed. However, 
should the court be of the opinion that the findings of fact 
are supported by the evidence and the conclusion of law, 
that the money was never invested in the uranium company 
as agreed by the parties and that the defendant has not ac-
counted for the funds, js justified, we then submit that in 
view of the foregoing rules that the judgment of the trial 
court must be reversed and the defendant be given an oppor-
tunity to meet these issues. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT BE-
CAUSE CONSIDERING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS, THE EVIDENCE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ANY MONEY JUDGMENT 
AND THE SOLE RELIEF TO WHJCH THE PLAINTIFFS 
ARE ENTITLED IS THE DELIVERY OF THE CERTIFI-
CATE OF STOCK IN COTTONWOOD URANIUM COR-
PORATION. 
A review of the entire transcript of the proceedings before 
the trial court and plaintiffs' complaint (R. 1) indicates that 
the matter the plaintiffs complain of was that the stock was 
never tendered to the plaintiff. The plaintiff admitted that 
when he was advised by the defendant, Mr. Lund, that his 
money had been invested in Cottonwood Uranium Corpora-
tion that he, the plaintiff, considered that Mr. Lund was 
making the investment pursuant to the plaintiffs' instructions 
(R. 21). The plaintiff indicated that numerous times he made 
demand upon Mr. Lund for the stock (R. 18) . Even assuming 
that Mr. Lund, and not the officers of the corporation, was 
under a duty to issue the stock to the plaintiffs, and, we 
submit, that there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Lund 
had any such duty, still on the status of the record the plaintiffs 
are not entitled to recover a money judgment. The only 
measure of dan1ages for the failure to deliver the certificate 
would be the difference between the market price when the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a delivery and the n1arket price 
when delivery was actually made. See Rock rs. Gustttz'eson 
Oil ConzpanyJ (Utah) 204 Pac. 96. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that the plaintiffs could 
have dealt with their interest in the corporation at any time 
after its formation. The only evidence in the record with regard 
to the plaintiffs' ownership of an interest in Cottonwood Ura-
nium Corporation prior to the time that the certificate of stock 
was issued and tendered into court was the testimony of Mr. 
Lund (R. 13) that Mr. D'Ambrosio's name was listed on the 
list of stock to be issued. We submit that this is sufficient 
to constitute Mr. D'Ambrosio a stockholder in the cor-
poration, Cottonwood Uranium Corporation. Mr. D'Ambrosio 
in effect became a subscriber to stock in the Cottonwood U ra-
nium Corporation and under the principles set forth by this 
court in the case of Van N oy vs. Gibbs, (Utah) 318 P2d. 3 51, 
\vould have allowed the plaintiffs, had they so desired, to sell 
or transfer their interest in the corporation without the necessity 
of having the stock certificate. In that case this court held: 
It is generally held that stock certificates are evi-
dence or muniments of title. Before stock certificates 
are issued, the subscribers to stock in a corporation 
own rights in respect thereto which may be sold or 
transferred. To hold otherwise would prevent a sub-
scriber from dealing with his rights in a corporation 
prior to the issuance of stock certificates. 
Therefore, we submit that there be no possible theory upon 
which the plaintiffs are entitled to a money judgment; that 
the judgment of the trial court should be set aside and a 
judgment of no cause of action be entered in favor of the 
defendant, Francis C. Lund. And, that it be ordered that the 
stock certificate in Cottonwood Uranium Corporation be de-
livered to the plaintiffs. 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing reasoning and authorities and 
the numerous errors committed by the trial court in this case, 
we submit that this matter should be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to make findings that the defendant 
complied with his instructions from the plaintiff George 
D'Ambrosio to invest $500.00 in a uranium company; that, 
such money was invested in Cottonwood Uranium Corporation 
pursuant to the instructions of the plaintiff George D'Ambrosio 
and enter its judgment that the plaintiffs are entitled to a 
delivery of the 500 share stock certificate in Cottonwood Ura-
nium Corporation which is in evidence. Or, in the alternative,1 
that defendant should be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G. HAL TAYLOR 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
366 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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